Exoskeleton progress yields slippery slope

Abstract

W. Cornwall's fascinating News Feature on the growing use of exoskeletons in the military—i.e., robotically augmented ambulatory systems—documented a number of technical hurdles yet to be overcome in this emerging technology (“In pursuit of the perfect power suit,” 16 October, p. [270][1]). In addition to their military potential, exoskeletons will aid many civilians suffering from restricted mobility. However, despite their possibilities, exoskeletons pose substantial ethical, legal, and social concerns that will quickly become all the more relevant with the rapid growth of both the military and civilian industries. ![Figure][2] A soldier tests a system built to augment walking performance. The ethical, legal, and social implications of exoskeletons such as this one have yet to be explored. PHOTO: PAUL FETTERS The ability to augment otherwise healthy individuals with military-grade exoskeletons starts us down the slippery slope of human enhancement, a challenging area with broad repercussions in conventional society ranging in applications from medicine to sports. Additionally, in transforming soldiers into quasi-machines, we risk further dehumanizing warfare and its human actors, raising the potential for abuse not only by the enemy, but by commanding officers. This capacity for exploitation can also affect civilian workers who will use exoskeletons in heavy industries. Even corrective uses associated with restoring abilities to the disabled raise social justice concerns relating to the availability of, and accessibility to, this life-altering technology. Therapeutic implementations may also compel us to redefine nontrivial concepts of disability and ableness in light of the growing capacity to technologically supplement human frailties; additionally, current legal and regulatory structures may be unable to appropriately fit newly abled individuals within current disability conventions. Not only will exoskeletons likely raise novel legal issues relating to product liability, but the potential to implant brain machine interfaces (BMIs) within the posterior parietal cortex, resulting in preconscious control over the exoskeleton, may challenge longstanding near-universal tenets of criminal law. In most jurisdictions, an individual cannot be guilty of a crime if they lack the threshold mens rea and actus reus (i.e., a guilty mind resulting in a guilty action). BMIs, particularly those supplemented with artificial intelligence, could result in arguably involuntary actions that confound criminal culpability and conceivably put into question even more fundamental issues of free will. In anticipating, promptly acknowledging, and perhaps even tackling these and other concerns, we can preempt and preclude potentially hampering legislation and regulation that might inhibit innovation. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.350.6258.270 [2]: pending:yes