Death from Above: UAVs and Losing Hearts and Minds

Abstract

ARMED UNMANNED AERIAL vehicles (UAVs) or drones are in constant use over Afghanistan and Pakistan tribal borderlands, Federally Administered Tribal Areas. As Washington and U.S. military see it, ideal use of Predator and Reaper drones is to pick offterrorist leaders. In 2007, hunter-killer drones were performing 21 combat air patrols at any one time, by end of 2009 they were flying 38, and in 2011 they increased to about 54 ongoing patrols. In 2009, Air Force reported that for first time they would be training more joystick pilots than new fighter and bomber pilots, creating a sustainable career path for those Air Force officers who fly UAVs.Wonder WeaponsPerhaps out of fear of strategic loss of national will over unpopular U.S. and coalition casualties, Central Command seems to have accepted drones as current weapon of choice in fight against Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Drones are reportedly knocking offthe bad guys right and left.1 According to one estimate, by March 2011 at least 33 Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders (high value targets) had been killed by drones and from 1,100 to 1,800 insurgent fighters had been killed as well.2 Tom Engelhardt observes in Drone Race to Near Future that UAVs are wonder weapon of moment, and can already see military-industrial-robotics complex in formation.3 In fact, as James Der Darian describes in Virtuous War: Mapping Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network, drones are already part of a massive and expanding military-industrial-mediaentertainment network.4The hype and hubris surrounding this technology is immense, and mainstream media has been full of glowing reports on drones, some of which imply that their use could win war against terrorism all by itself. For example, an April 2009 report claimed that drones were killing Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders and the rest [of their numbers] have begun fighting among themselves out of panic and suspicion. If you were to continue on this pace, counterterrorism consultant Juan Zarate told LA Times, al Qaida is dead.5 In an uncritical 60 Minutes report on U.S. Air Force drone operations in May 2009, officer in charge was asked if mistakes were ever made in drone attacks: What if you get it wrong? We don't, was his response.6The Air Force declares that its priority is to precisely target insurgents while avoiding civilian casualties. They strongly aver that they are very concerned about civilian casualties, that they take extreme measures to avoid them, and that casualty avoidance can be targeting team's most timeintensive task.7 At Combined Air and Space Operations Center, Middle East, a military lawyer (judge advocate) is always on duty to provide advice reflecting Law of Armed Conflict, international treaties that prohibit intentional targeting of civilians and require militaries to minimize risks to civilians. The Air Force also asserts that a strict NATO protocol requires high-level approval for air strikes when civilians are known to be in or near Al-Qaeda or Taliban targets, and when civilians are detected, strikes are called off. The U.S. military claims its targeting is extremely precise, and that it has called offmany operations when it appeared that civilian casualties might result.8 Such claims are consistent with counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics outlined in Field Manual 3-24.Today, UAV use is being hyped as the future of war, only good thing to come out of war on terrorism, and an effective and highly discriminate counterterrorism and counterinsurgency weapon. No one doubts that robots will eventually occupy a central role in U.S. military. Surviving aspects of Army's now-defunct Future Combat Systems modernization effort (now Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program) call for a host of unmanned vehicles and combat drones. As P.W. Singer has shown in Wired for War, such modernization entails unprecedented changes in perspective. …