Adversarial FDI Attack Monitoring: Toward Secure Defense of Industrial Electronics

摘要

With the rapid developments in computational and communication resources, modern industrial electronics systems can leverage networked structures to realize wireless remote control. However, owing to the intrinsically more open attributes of their cyberrealms, an adversary could eavesdrop on the sensitive information of control systems to elaborate insidious false data injection (FDI) attacks, leading to the destruction of safety performance at the control systems level while potentially also performing disguising capabilities against traditional anomaly detectors. In this article, we first introduce three kinds of FDI attack monitoring architectures while discussing their applicability to stealthy corruptions and capturing their advantages and deficiencies. Then, we discuss the significant meanings of FDI attack monitoring for deploying secure defense control, where the interconnections as well as the distinctions between safety and security, the methodologies of isolation and compensation for FDI attack-resilient control, and their great potential of integration with information security and machine learning techniques are discussed. Finally, a case study of an autonomous robot in an industrial electronics system is performed to provide viewpoints for researchers and practitioners. The purpose of this review is to retrospect the representative results on FDI attack monitoring and control and provide meticulous insights to advance the developments in safety and reliability of cyberphysical systems (CPSs).