Life Without Degrees of Moral Status

Abstract

Abstract Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. They believe, most prominently, that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them, and eat them for dinner. Belief in degrees of moral status also raises concern that robots and genetically enhanced human beings could become significantly more important than the rest of us, in which case they might be justified in putting us in cages, experimenting on us, and eating us for dinner. The present work thus systematically assesses whether, in fact, some individuals are more important morally than others. It distinguishes between moral status conferring, moral action guiding, and moral status enhancing properties, and it argues that degrees of moral status require moral status enhancing properties. It then considers whether some properties are moral status enhancing in the sense that they increase the most status of those who possess them. This analysis reveals that there are no moral status enhancing properties—hence, no degrees of moral status. The book finishes by considering the implications of this conclusion for seven important issues: (1) the difference between a world that includes degrees of moral status and one that doesn’t; (2) our obligations to help animals; (3) animal rights; (4) raising animals and eating them; (5) animal experimentation; (6) humans who lack superior cognitive capacities; and (7) genetically enhanced human beings, human-animal chimeras, and robots.