Children’s attribution of mental states to humans and social robots assessed with the Theory of Mind Scale

Abstract

The present work examined children's attribution of psychological properties to inanimate agents in two experiments. In Study 1, an Interview Task and the Theory of Mind Scale (ToM Scale) were administered to 4-year-olds with either a human or a humanoid robot (NAO) protagonist. Parents also completed the Children's Social Understanding Scale (CSUS) to assess children's Theory of Mind skills. Overall, children performed similarly on the Interview and the ToM Scale. Theory of Mind skills (CSUS) did not predict performance on either task (ToM Scale or Interview). In Study 2, 5-year-olds were tested with figurines of different humanoid robots for the ToM Scale. Additionally, a Property Projection Task assessed biological, psychological, sensory, and artifact attributions to people, robots, animals, and artifacts. The results indicated that children attributed mental states similarly to the robots and the humans in the ToM Scale but did not anthropomorphize the robots in the Property Projection Task. In contrast to Study 1, the parental measure of children's ToM skills (CSUS) predicted performance on the ToM Scale in the Human Condition. Overall, the present findings indicate that mentalizing is generalized to humanoid robots by preschoolers, particularly when child-friendly scenarios are used.