To Stay or to Bypass: Unraveling Mainline Vehicles' Aggregate Strategic Decision-Making at Highway Weaving Ramps

Abstract

The weaving ramp scenario is a critical bottleneck in highway networks due to conflicting flows and complex interactions among merging, exiting, and through vehicles. In this work, we propose a game-theoretic model to capture and predict the aggregate lane choice behavior of mainline through vehicles as they approach the weaving zone. Faced with potential conflicts from merging and exiting vehicles, mainline vehicles can either bypass the conflict zone by changing to an adjacent lane or stay steadfast in their current lane. Our model effectively captures these strategic choices using a small set of parameters, requiring only limited traffic measurements for calibration. The model's validity is demonstrated through SUMO simulations, achieving high predictive accuracy. The simplicity and flexibility of the proposed framework make it a practical tool for analyzing bottleneck weaving scenarios and informing traffic management strategies.