Why computers will never be people

摘要

The notion that computers and robots either have a measure of intelligence, or at least will have at some stage, has firmly taken root in Western culture. It has inspired a slew of science fiction novels and films, and one of these, 'The Matrix', has attained the status of a modern classic. Moreover, it has powerful advocates in the scientific and philosophical fraternities, the most prominent of whom are probably Daniel Dennett and Stephen Pinker. In my opinion, however, most of the ideas that make up this most influential of popular themes are demonstrably false. I approach the issue by way of a critique of Daniel Dennett, who mounts perhaps the most sophisticated defense of such ideas. Dennett is charged with fudging the distinction between an instrumental and a realist adoption of the 'intentional stance' towards an entity. Other, more reductionist, positions are critiqued. I conclude with an outline of the philosophy of mind which underlies my approach, which may be termed 'paninteriorism', following Ken Wilber, and a sketch of what I think it would take to produce a sentient, aware computer or robot.