A Profit Sharing Mechanism for Coordinated Power Traffic System

摘要

The transportation network operator (TNO) and the power distribution network operator (DNO) act non cooperatively during the scheduling process. Under the TNOs management, the distribution of charging load may exacerbate the local supply-demand imbalance in the power distribution network (PDN), which negatively impacts the secure and economic operation of the PDN. This paper proposes a profit sharing mechanism based on the principle of incentive compatibility for coordinating the transportation network (TN) and the PDN to minimize the total operation cost of the PDN. In this mechanism, the scheduling process of the power transportation system is divided into two stages. At the prescheduling stage, the TNO allocates traffic flow and charging load without considering the operation of the PDN, after which the DNO schedules and obtains the original cost. At the rescheduling stage, the DNO shares part of the saved dispatch cost to motivate the TNO to reallocate the EVs charging, which is more beneficial to the operation of the PDN. This two-stage process is then simulated by two single level models and a bilevel model. Finally, the optimal sharing ratio is identified, at which the total scheduling cost of the DNO can decrease to the lowest point when gaming with the TNO. The efficiency of the proposed mechanism is simulated via a coupled network with 12 traffic nodes and 18 electric buses. Numerical results demonstrate that the DNO can achieve the minimum total cost. Simultaneously, the TNO can also benefit from the proposed profit-sharing mechanism.