Joel Parthemore
Papers
4
Total Citations
70
H-Index
3
About
Joel Parthemore’s research sits at the fascinating intersection of machine consciousness, moral philosophy, and cognitive science. His most influential work, “Synthetic Phenomenology Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience” (2007, 45 citations), pioneers a novel approach: using embodied artefacts not to instantiate phenomenal states, but to model and specify the non-conceptual content of visual experience—content that eludes standard linguistic description. This methodological innovation offers a powerful tool for exploring the structure of consciousness without the metaphysical baggage of creating a conscious machine. Parthemore’s contributions extend deeply into the ethics of artificial intelligence. In “Moral Agency, Moral Responsibility, and Artifacts” (2014, 19 citations), he provocatively argues that the question of whether artefacts can be moral agents is a red herring. Instead, he demonstrates that even without full moral agency, artefacts can—and do—make genuine moral claims upon us, reshaping our understanding of responsibility in human-machine interactions. This work challenges conventional ethical frameworks and has significant implications for AI design and policy. With a career spanning phenomenology, robotics, and moral philosophy, Parthemore offers a uniquely integrative perspective, making him a compelling voice for anyone grappling with the philosophical and practical challenges of intelligent systems.
Research Focus
Key Achievements
Top Papers
- 1Synthetic Phenomenology Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience45 citations · 2007
- 2
- 3Moral agency, moral responsibility, and artefacts4 citations · 2012
- 4Robotic Specification of the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience2 citations · 2007