Democratic Reciprocity*

摘要

Reciprocity, the two-sided social norm of fairness that involves a duty to return favors, as well as the permission to return injuries, is widely recognized as a fundamental norm "not only for primitive but for all societies."1 Similarly, "[r]eciprocity is widely recognized as a core principle of democracy."2 Modern democracy is a system of conflict resolution that rests on reciprocal restraints: norm compliance by all actors is mutual and contingent on compliance by others. The animating spirit of democratic norms is neither sacrifice nor exploitation, but reciprocity. Good democrats are neither suckers nor scoundrels, but fair fighters. Despite the apparent consensus on the fundamental relevance of democratic reciprocity, the normative demands it entails have remained opaque, particularly its normative demands in the face of potential or actual transgressions of democratic norms. Normative theories of democracy tend to conceive democracy as a system of mutual cooperation which is sustained by norms of mutual cooperation ("positive reciprocity"). Empirical theories of democracy tend to conceive democracy as a system of mutual cooperation which is endangered by norms of mutual retaliation ("negative reciprocity"). With the exception of debates on militant democracy and civil disobedience, normative theorists have thought little about the demands of reciprocity in situations of "partial compliance," where adherence to democratic norms is problematic. Empirical scholars, by contrast, have assumed these demands to be absolute. If one actor breaks the rules, they have observed, others follow suit and reciprocate normative breaches in the name of justice and self-protection. They initiate spirals of retaliation that put democratic equilibria at risk. Partial compliance opens the door to democratic breakdown. The cooperative demands of reciprocity are straightforward in ideal situations of universal compliance; they direct all citizens to do their "fair share" and cooperate with everybody else who is doing the same. By contrast, in a world where adherence to democratic norms is problematic, the normative demands of reciprocity likewise become problematic. They enter into tension with the demands of democratic preservation. The notion of "democracy-preserving reciprocity" which I introduce in this article recognizes this normative tension and proposes to resolve it through a balancing act that accepts the normative force of "negative reciprocity," yet subordinates it to the imperatives of democratic preservation. Democratic reciprocity thus understood is not a simple normative principle. To prevent the unraveling of democratic cooperation in vicious circles of mutual punishment, it does not permit symmetrical moves of "tit for tat," direct retaliation in the biblical sense of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." In the service of democracy preservation, it is instead a complex principle that asks for the self-restrained and self-reflexive balancing of "conflicting imperatives."3 It responds to the competitive, as well as to the cooperative, demands of democracy. Accepting the logic of political self-preservation, it permits actors to protect their competitive capacities. Yet, imposing the primacy of regime preservation, it compels them to protect the cooperative foundations of democracy. After outlining the animating logic of democratic reciprocity, I will lay out its self-limiting demands in two contrasting contexts: democratic normality and democratic subversion. Despite a widespread recognition of democracy's reciprocal foundations, political science has invested little effort in elucidating the concrete nature of reciprocal democratic norms and commitments. We know that they are essential to the working of democracy and that their dissolution often precedes and precipitates the demise of democracy. Yet, we have spent little systematic thought on their normative logic in a ("non-ideal") world where compliance with basic democ